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ESSAY

REFLECTIONS ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION IN
THE SECOND CIRCUIT, FROM THE PERSPECTIVE
OF LEARNED HAND'S DAYS
Gerald Gunther*
In venturing some thoughts on judicial administration in
the Second Circuit, I tread on dangerous ground: I cannot
assert the same expertise I can claim about constitutional law
or judicial biography. As Learned Hand's biographer,'
however, I can speak with some confidence about his views of
the subject, although I am quite aware that his Second Circuit
service, from 1924 to 1961, occurred in an era that must seem
rather antiquarian in the 1990s. In addition, I have by no
means any inside sense of the problems the exploding caseload
has brought to the federal appellate courts-not even the kind
of insider's view one can gather as a law clerk, as I was for
Hand in 1953-54. Yet some comparative comments on the past
and the present may be appropriate. And this effort may be
worthwhile if only to assuage former Chief Judge Feinberg's
concern that "judicial administration is the stepchild of the
law," that it is "in large part ignored or, at best, tolerated by
law schools, law reviews and scholars."2
Despite my eagerness to make amends for past neglect, I
cannot help but bring to bear the rather jaundiced view

*
1

William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE (1994).

2 Wilfred Feinberg, Foreword: Judicial Administration: Stepchild of the Law,

52 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 187, 188 (1978).
Fully conscious of my neglect of the field in the past, I dedicate these
comments to my friend, one of the great judges of the modem Second Circuit,
Wilfred Feinberg.
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Learned Hand took of most matters of administration, even
while he dispatched them with the kind of care he
characteristically bestowed upon all matters, large and small,
that came before him,3 most especially the many thousands of
cases he had to decide. Immersion in the life and work of Hand
for more than two decades makes his impact on me
unavoidable.
In effect Hand served as chief judge of the Circuit from
February 1939, when the beleaguered Martin T. Manton
resigned, until 1951, when Hand retired "from regular, active
service."4 At the outset, he was simply the "Senior Circuit
Judge" since the office of chief judge was not so designated
until the 1948 revision of the federal judicial code.5 But from
the outset, Hand's position as senior circuit judge imposed a
host of new administrative duties on him, although the range
of those was not nearly as great as it is today.6 A few days
before Hand became senior circuit judge, he noted that the
duties of the post did not seem "very formidable," and believed
that he would not have to spend much time on them: "After
all, a judge spends substantially all his time in judging-or at
least he ought to."' Even he, however, found that his
administrative duties were more time-consuming than he
would have liked. Occasionally he complained about the
burden, but in fact he probably spent less than ten percent of
his time on administrative chores.8 By contrast, Wilfred
Feinberg, at the time that he was chief judge in 1984, thought
his administrative duties absorbed about fifty percent of his
time.9 Changing times and circumstances have made much of
this inevitable. For example, during most of Hand's years as
chief judge, the Second Circuit comprised only six judges;
today, its personnel is more than twice that number and its

s See Henry J. Friendly, Learned Hand: An Expression From the Second
Circuit, 29 BROOK. L. REV. 6, 13 (1962).
4 28 U.S.C. § 371 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 869, 871 (1948), codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988).
6

See Wilfred Feinberg, The Office of Chief Judge of a Federal Court of

Appeals, 53 FoRDHAM L. REV. 369 (1984). The 1948 law provided that the "circuit
judge senior in commission shall be the chief judge of the circuit." Id. at 370 n.6.
7 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 514.
B GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 514-15.
Feinberg, supra note 6, at 384.
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caseload has grown dramatically. Moreover, the Circuit today
needs to call in outside help far more often to form its
panels. 0
The sharp increase in personnel, non-judicial as well as
judicial, and especially the dramatic growth in the number of
cases to be processed, raises a host of problems for all judges,
not just the chief judge. Indeed, what has happened since
Hand's day has been described as a "crisis"" for the federal
courts, above all a crisis with respect to the kind of judging
that is possible on the Second Circuit. The traditional
model-the model with which I am most familiar from my
clerkship days and especially from my work on Learned Hand's
biography, the model that has indeed been described as the
"Hart-Hand model""--views the federal appellate court as
above all a collegial body composed of a small number of
judges, a body that is deliberative and that produces
adequately reasoned results. It is that model that is in crisis
because, as Professor Monaghan puts it, the "litigation
explosion carries with it the increasing bureaucratization of
the federal appellate process."" That litigation explosion,
reflected in the mounting caseload, clearly puts special
pressure on, and may endanger, the maintenance of the kind of
collegial, deliberative tribunal on which Hand served and over
which he presided.
Bearing in mind the limited qualifications I bring to
assessment of issues of judicial administration, I will restrict
myself to a few features of Second Circuit practices that had
their fullest flowering during Hand's years: the use of preconference memoranda; the role and number of law clerks; the
limited resort to en banc hearings; " and the conduct of

See, e.g., Wilfred Feinberg, Foreword: Senior Judges: A National Resource, 56
BROOIK L. REV. 409 (1990). The Circuit's caseload has increased more than tenfold
since Hand's time. See id. at 413.
" See RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
12 Henry P. Monaghan, Taking Bureaucracy Seriously, 99 HARV. L. REV. 344,
10

345 (1985)

(reviewing RIcHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND

REFOR
(1985)). In preparing these reflections, I was much stimulated by
Professor Monaghan's thoughtful, brilliant review of Judge Posner's book.
13 Id.
" Like

Judge Newman, I prefer 'en banc" to "in banc," the term used in the
current statutes and rules; unlike Jon Newman, I can afford to invoke the
autonomy of a law professor to ignore the official commands. See Jon 0. Newman,

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60: 505

Circuit Judicial Conferences.
Pre-conference memos. Probably no "procedural" feature
contributed as much to the enviable quality of the Second
Circuit in Learned Hand's days as the use (and enthusiastic
support, by all of the judges) of pre-conference memos.
Reliance on pre-conference memos contributed immeasurably
to the collegiality, deliberativeness and reasoned elaboration of
judgments that made Hand's court the nation's outstanding
one. Their use played a central part in realizing the ideal of
the Hart-Hand model on the Second Circuit.
The Second Circuit's pre-conference memo practice already
existed when Hand took his seat there in 1924, but it reached
its peak during his tenure for the next thirty-seven years, and
he was its exemplary practitioner." The main purpose of the
pre-conference memo-in more recent years referred to as
"voting memo"It--was to promote individual consideration of
each case prior to giving it collegiate attention. In Hand's day,
members of the judicial panel did not discuss the cases until
more than a week after the end of oral arguments. Before
conferring with their colleagues, each judge worked through
the case, reached tentative conclusions, and circulated memos
stating their tentative thoughts. The practice assured an
unequaled degree of intellectual engagement. The memos
typically ranged from two to four pages; in Hand's case they
were frequently longer than that. The usual consequence of the
pre-conference memo practice was to shorten the time needed
to confer about a case in the judges' conferences, for the discussion could concentrate on areas of disagreement rather than on
efforts to identify the central issues. Moreover, the memos
proved useful after the judges conferred, helping the presiding
judge to make assignments of opinions and aiding recollections
when draft opinions were circulated."7
For several years after Hand stepped down as chief judge
in 1951, the memo practice continued unabated, receiving
especially strong support from Judges Henry J. Friendly and
Foreword: In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit: The Virtues of Restraint, 50
BROOK. L. REV. 365, 365 n.1 (1984).
15 See GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 286-88.
Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 298 (1986).
'7 Id. at 301.
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Harold R. Medina. 8 As recently as 1986, then-Chief Judge
Feinberg reported that the judges' support for the practice,
though somewhat modified, persisted. More recently, however,
there has been less use of pre-conference memos. 9 Presumably, the mounting caseload of the circuit and the intense
workload of every judge provides a large part of the
explanation for this decreasing practice. Moreover, preparing
pre-conference memos produces special inconveniences for
judges living outside the New York metropolitan area. Because
the memo practice precludes voting on cases during the week
of arguments, the out-of-town judges are often required to
return to New York City for the conference on the cases that
they have heard.
These concerns are understandable, but nonetheless
regrettable, especially if they augur impending abandonment
of pre-conference memos by the court. The memos'
contributions to collegiality and the quality of the ultimate
judicial product are time-tested and enormous. The
contemporary doubts about the practice testify to the impact of
the modern caseload on the realization of the admirable
ingredients of the Hart-Hand model. But abandonment of the
memo practice today cannot be wholly attributed to the
growing caseload. Judge Medina, for example, was initially
skeptical about "this extra work," yet he quickly came to see
the memo process as "a wonderful thing." ° It would be a
mistake for today's hard-pressed judges to think that the Hand
era was typically one of light work and ample time for
reflection, as Learned Hand's "ownenormous output of opinions
and the thirty-nine boxes of pre-conference memos in the
Learned Hand Papers amply demonstrate. One can only hope
that, despite mounting doubts, the judges will find a way to
continue this practice, an important ingredient of the Second
Circuit's high reputation.
Law Clerks. The use of law clerks by the judges was an
important institutional arrangement during most of Hand's
years on the Second Circuit. The benefit to recent law school
'8 Id. at 302.
" Letter from Wilfred Feinberg to Gerald Gunther (Sept. 22, 1994) (on file

with author).
2 Harold R. Medina, Some Reflections on the Judicial Function at the Appellate
Level, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q. 148, 150.
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graduates chosen as clerks was and is self-evident, but the
provision of assistance by law clerks has also played an
important role in the Circuit's special personal and intellectual
atmosphere. Hand himself was the pioneer among lower court
judges in using law clerks decades before Congress provided
funding for the position. From 1909 through 1911, Hand
imaginatively used public funding for a stenographer to hire a
law-trained assistant to help him not only with secretarial
chores but also with legal research. When Hand joined the
Second Circuit in 1924, he was more eager than ever to have a
young law-trained companion at his side. In the continued
absence of congressional funding, he and his colleague Thomas
W. Swan paid out of their own pockets for a shared law clerk.
At last, in 1930, Congress provided financial support for the
law clerk position.
For the rest of his career, Hand, like every other judge of
his time, had only one law clerk. The working relationship
between the law clerk and Hand was, it is safe to say,
unique-indeed, of a kind to make any modern law clerk turn
green with envy. No clerk for Hand ever wrote a single word,
either in producing research memoranda or in drafting
opinions. Instead, the Hand-law clerk relationship was one of
extraordinary intellectual intimacy: it consisted entirely of
face-to-face contacts, not any written work. The sole role of
Hand's clerks was to familiarize themselves in any way they
could with the issues pending before the judge and to serve as
critics of the judge's thinking, pre-conference memos, and
opinions as they evolved. Hand's constant hunger for critical
analysis was part and parcel of his distinctiveness as a judge.
He had a deep-rooted open-mindedness and skepticism about
his work; he was not cocksure about anything; he had a
genuine capacity for listening and indeed a deep-seated desire
for points of view different than his own. These traits made
him view conversations with his clerks as essential to his
performance of his judicial function and vital to his inquiring
mind, which never grew complacent and was never closed.21
Today, the situation is very different. Since 1980, active

21

See GUNTHER,

supra note 1,

at 288-91,

for my discussion

of Hand's

relationships with his clerks. Sometimes this process would produce more than a
dozen draft opinions, all wholly written by Judge Hand. Id. at 620.
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federal appellate judges have been authorized to employ three
law clerks." I hope that it is not mere nostalgia for my
unforgettable year with Hand that makes me suspect that the
expanding personal staff of judges may further erode the
Second Circuit's capacity to continue the Hart-Hand model.
The very large expansion in the number of supporting
personnel for judges has, as Professor Monaghan persuasively
argues, "profoundly affected the institutional character of the
inferior federal courts."2 Federal judges, he notes, "have
increasingly become managers who direct, coordinate, and
review the activities of subordinates."' The reliance on law
clerks in opinion drafting, Monaghan also states, has resulted
in opinions that are "all too frequently prolix, unimaginative,
indecisive, and less credible.""
Certainly, as someone who is professionally obligated to
read Supreme Court opinions more regularly and thoroughly
than those of the Courts of Appeals, I have long thought that
the prolixity (without greater clarity) of Supreme Court
opinions correlates closely with the even greater increases in
staff help the Supreme Court justices have received over the
years. Of course, the litigation explosion, the growing caseload,
is the main villain in this as well as other problems of
appellate courts. The costs are real: it is impossible for a judge
to have the same close relationship with law clerks once the
staff has grown from one law clerk and one secretary to a
small battalion. While it is reassuring to learn that the Second
Circuit continues to strive, often successfully, for the high
standards of judicial performance set by Learned Hand and his
colleagues,26 it is important to note that the growing
' Thomas J. Meskill, Foreword: Caseload Growth: Struggling to Keep Pace, 57
BROOK. L. REV. 299, 303 (1991).
Monaghan, supra note 12, at 346.
2, Monaghan, supra note 12, at 346; see also POSNER, supra note 11, at 97,
103-04.
2 Monaghan, supra note 12, at 347. Judge Posner has documented some of
these unfortunate impacts at some length. POSNER, supra note 11, at 102-19.
2 Commenting on the meaning of Hand's tradition to the Second Circuit today,
Wilfred Feinberg stated:
His greatest impact, I believe, was in exemplifying the view that each
case is important and that almost as much time and effort should be
spent on the unglamorous cases as on the blockbusters. Friendly
continued this tradition. With increased caseloads, the tradition is
(necessarily?) slipping away, but it is a worthy ideal that still has its
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bureaucratization of the federal judiciary threatens to
undermine the basis for the Hart-Hand model and to impair
the quality of judging traditionally performed in the courts of
appeals.
En bane proceedings. In one important respect, the Second
Circuit has come admirably close to adhering to Hand's views:
it has nearly mirrored his skepticism about, and indeed
antipathy toward, en banc proceedings. Federal courts of
appeals have been authorized to rehear rulings by three-judge
panels before the full complement of active judges ever since a
Supreme Court decision in 1941;27 Congress confirmed that
power in 1948.2" Judge Hand, however, had nothing but scorn

for the utility of such hearings. As early as 1941, Hand stated
that, "for myself, I should never vote to convene" an en banc
court. Hand kept that promise to the end, and he mocked those
courts that resorted to the practice with ever growing
frequency. As he once wrote to his friend, Judge Herbert
Goodrich of the Third Circuit: "I cannot but admire [Third
Circuit Chief Judge] John Biggs' device of having all the judges
of a Circuit sit together; it so much increases the certainty of
the result. For example, [in a recent en banc ruling, the Third
Circuit's] vote is four to three, when it might have been only
two to one."29 Then-Chief Judge Feinberg reported in 1984
that he thought, in the best tradition of Hand, "that for the
most part in bancs are not a good idea: They consume an
enormous amount of time and often do little to clarify the
law.""0 In the same year, Judge Newman stated that the
Second Circuit did not convene an en banc proceeding until
1956 and that its record for 1980 to 1983 showed significantly

effect, particularly in the cases that result in published opinions.
Letter from Wilfred Feinberg to John P. Frank (June 27, 1994), quoted in John P.
Frank, 108 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (reviewing Learned Hand: The Man
and the Judge).
Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 314 U.S. 326,
333-35 (1941).
28 Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 869, 871 (1948), codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). See the very useful discussion in Newman,
supra note 13, at 366. On Hand's attitude toward en bancs, see GUNTHER, supra
note 1, at 515-16.
GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 516.
3' Feinberg, supra note 6, at 376-77.
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fewer en bancs than any other circuit in the nation.3 It is my
impression that the Second Circuit has maintained its
reluctance to convene en bancs and has held the number of
such cases to a minimum.
It seems strange that so many circuits are far more lenient
than the Second in granting en bancs even while such hearings
clearly impose added pressure on the already burdened
workload of every judge. Perhaps this phenomenon is itself a
reflection of the workload problem, which has resulted in a
larger number of court of appeals judges around the nation,
with the resultant greater risk that a particular three-judge
panel's ruling may not adequately reflect the full bench's
views. Perhaps, in short, the heavier caseload has produced
more judges-which has diminished collegiality-and increased
the risks of conflicts, adding further pressure for en bancs.
Whatever the reason, the Second Circuit's resistance to this
trend is surely occasion for applause.
Circuit Judicial Conference. Shortly after Learned Hand
began to preside over the Second Circuit in 1939, Congress
mandated an annual meeting of all of the active circuit and
district judges "for the purpose of considering the business of
the courts and advising ways and means of improving the
administration of justices within [each] circuit."33 Although
Circuit Judicial Conferences are hardly uppermost in the mind
of the chief judge and his or her colleagues during most of the
year, the treatment of this statutory mandate by Hand and his
successors offers a revealing contrast to the current practice.
Hand, characteristically disdaining pomp, circumstance
and formal gatherings, implemented the statute's requirements
in a manner least likely to detract him and his fellow judges
from their primary task of deciding cases. In most circuits the
annual conferences quickly became two- or three-day affairs,
where the judges could socialize, attend discussion sessions,
and mingle with invited members of the Bar. Throughout his
years as head of the Second Circuit, from 1939 to 1951, Hand
31 Newman, supra note 14, at 365-66, 371.
32

See Jon 0.

Newman, In Banc Practice in the Second Circuit, 1989-93, 60

BROOK. L. REV. 491, 491-92 (1994).
' Act of August 7, 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-299, § 307, 53 Stat. 1223, 1224
(1939), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See
generally, GUNTHER supra note 1, at 516-17.
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would have nothing to do with the grand gatherings which in
other circuits often brought together 500 to 1000 people for a
mixture of business and camaraderie. Instead, he typically sent
a brief annual notice to every judge, citing the statutory
provision mandating the meeting and announcing that the
year's conference would take place in a room at the Foley
Square Courthouse in downtown Manhattan at a specified date
and hour. He announced, moreover, that he expected the
proceedings would take very little time; and he usually
appended a blanket excuse in advance for any judge who had
more important business to transact on the scheduled day.34
Once, Hand sought the aid of a district judge to help prepare a
minimal agenda for the annual conference, but he made clear
that the Second Circuit should avoid the extravagance
commonplace in others-which occurred, as he told the district
judge, "perhaps because they are not so busy" as the Second
Circuit.35 At another time, Hand described an impending
conference to a former law clerk, saying that the conference
members
will all be there, feeling pretty important. [We] shall talk a great
deal to show each other how sagacious we are; [we] shall settle some
things to present to Congress which Congress will probably not do.
Then we shall go home with the sense that we are rather nice chaps
which is really the case.36

The conduct of the Circuit Judicial Conference has
changed significantly since Hand's day as chief. The change
began under the leadership of Chief Judge Charles E. Clark, in
1955. Nowadays, a gathering of several hundred, including
invited lawyers, meets for two and one-half days "in an area
far from the madding crowd," as then-Chief Judge Feinberg
put it." This certainly is not because the Second Circuit is
"not so busy" these days as in Hand's time. Rather, the difference is Hand's preference for personal relations among judges
rather than formal, bureaucratic ones. Perhaps the larger
" Under the law, attendance by each judge is mandatory, "unless excused by
the chief judge." 28 U.S.C. § 333 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
" Letter from Learned Hand to Mortimer W. Byers (Mar. 8, 1946) (on file
with the Harvard Law Library).
"6Letter from Learned Hand to Louis Henkin (Sept. 21, 1944) (on file with the
Harvard Law Library).
"' Feinberg, supra note 6, at 382.
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number of judges in the circuit today makes Hand's approach
no longer feasible.
Nevertheless, it is heartening to see the recent news from
the District of Columbia Circuit's Fifty-fifth Annual Circuit
Conference in 1994. A legal newspaper recently announced
that the Annual Conference, "with its tennis and golf tournaments, banquets, and schmoozing, just got a little less annual,"
for then-Chief Judge Abner Mikva told the attendees that the
Conference will not convene next year. (Chief Judge Mikva
reported that "the judges agreed on this 'display of frugality'
because of budget constraints and forced staff reductions." 8 )
Perhaps gaining additional worktime in this manner may recommend itself to the Second Circuit as well.
Conclusion. As these comments suggest, so far the Second
Circuit has done better than most in trying to adhere to the
essentials of the Hart-Hand model. Yet the ineluctable forces
of a growing caseload and spreading bureaucratization make it
difficult to believe that the model can long survive, at least in
the absence of drastic preservative measures. Serious consideration of such measures seems very much in order. For example, Professor Monaghan has cogently argued that
what is left of the Hart-Hand model of the courts of appeals can be
maintained, if at all, only by sacrificing those courts' traditional
'corrective function'; that is, by eliminating appeals as of right, at
least over large categories of cases ....

In the near future, the de-

fenders of the Hart-Hand model may need to assert their preference
for discretionary review over some review as of right ......

Once again revealing my penchant for nostalgia and my
affliction of ignorance, I would add that any discussion of reforms might well bear in mind a comment in my Hand biography:
Despite-perhaps because of-his low regard for elaborate bureaucratic structures, committees, and formal meetings, Hand proved to
be a superb administrator, eliciting enormous respect and affection
from the judges of his circuit. He attended to all important administrative chores punctiliously, but he did not let them govern his life,
or his work as a judge."

LEGAL TIMEs, June 13, 1994, at 3.
"' Monaghan, supra note 12, at 357-58 (footnote omitted).
40 GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 517.
3,

